“Men can see nothing around them that is not their own
image; everything speaks to them of themselves. Their very landscape is alive.”
Karl Marx (quoted from Burgin, 1996)
Now it is widely accepted that subject and object, mind
and matter, human and thing co-constitute each other (Hodder 2001: 155). “Persons make things and things make
persons,” writes archaeologist Christopher Tilley (2004: 217). “Consciousness
does not occur in our brains, but is dynamically distributed, boundary
crossing, offloaded, and environmentally situated within materiality” (Noe
2008: 68). The seemingly irretrievable wedge between the material world and the
human mind, placed there by Enlightened, Cartesian thinking, is finally being
dissolved (Olsen 2010: 64).[1]
There is no purely ‘subjective’ understandings of place, landscape, or
material thing, because both experience and interpretation derive from and
relate to the objectivity of the material presence of things we perceive
(Tilley 2004: 219). This insight
has inspired, within the humanities, a renewed interest in the material world
and materiality’s role in the construction of subjective experience. It has
also provided a common language through which many different human endeavors
can now communicate (Hodder 2011: 173).
Can we study materiality with regards
to something so seemingly immaterial as masculinity? Whether it is a type of
consciousness, an performance, a trend/habit of human activity, or an imaginary
concept, there must be material (bodies, adornments, clothing, occupations,
images, role models) upon which masculinity is based. Anthropologist Jean-Pierre
Warnier (2001: 6) asks, “Are not all our actions, without any exception
whatsoever, propped up by or inscribed in a given materiality?” A review
of the literature on materiality (Hodder, Ingold, Donald, Warnier, Tilley,
Abram, Noe, Olson) delivers three major insights that may help our investigation
into the material component of masculinity: one, a person’s perceptual field
extends beyond the body and into incorporated things; two, the material world
has agency over human actions; and three, identity and its memories profoundly
depend on material things.
[1] Postmodern literary critic Katherine Hayles investigates the
social and cultural processes that led to the conceptualization of information
as separate from the material that instantiates it. See: How We Became
Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics,(Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1999.)
How incorporated tools act as perceptual extensions is
described best by the Blind Man’s Cane analogy. Warnier (2001) looks to Paul
Shilder’s essay The Image of the Body (1935), where he wrote that the
blind person’s cane is integrated into his consciousness field to such an
extent that his perception is not projected from his hand, but from the tip of
the cane. ‘The body’ can thus extend to
include lots of objects, rendering its boundaries flexible (Warnier 2001: 7). For this reason, Malafouris (2008) says
material things should be seen as continuous and active parts of the human
cognitive architecture. People
‘think’ through material culture, and therefore, materiality is what Malafouris,
along with DeMarrais (2004) and Menary et all (2010) call “the extended mind.” I like to think of social media as extensions of our perception, and we can "poke" people with it. Now there is a Facebook Jacket that squeezes you whenever someone likes you online.
Expanding on the pioneering work of Marcel Mauss (1936),
Warnier also shows that the ‘techniques’ of the body (such as walking, eating,
sitting, and dancing…what Ingold (2000) calls our “skills”) are almost always
locally determined, and therefor variable from society to society.
Things
move people, and also keep people around. Archaeologist Christopher Tilley
examines in Body and Image (2008) how
rock art moves people’s bodies into viewing positions. Likewise, the paintings
on the gallery wall, according to Merleau-Ponty, move us into to the best possible
place from which to view them (1962: 302). Bricks trapped Neolithic people into
long-term relationships with walls (Hodder 2011: 161). Bells, according to Richard
Raff (2003) rang the size of towns in early America and determined how far away
from the bell people could move. The domestication of wheat domesticated humans
into continually harvesting, pounding, and roasting it (Hodder 2011: 162). Technology
used humans to progress itself (Kelly 2010).
Material forms act as key “sensuous metaphors of
identity” (Tilley 217). Even cultural myths and cosmologies depend on them
(von Dechend, 1998).[1]
Focusing on ancient stones in landscapes, Tilley uncovers how our prehistoric
social identities were created, sustained, reproduced and transformed through the
agency of stones (namely by their ability to demarcate place). Things can also
communicate subjective states across time. For example, the hundreds of
thousands of personalized, handmade daggers carried by French and English
soldiers in WWI tell us something about the subjective state of the soldiers
that the soldiers themselves cannot, and will not, communicate (Warnier 2011:
398). The dagger was not just a hunk of metal, but an ensouled consort
integrated (and ‘introjected’) into the consciousness field, and “motions and
emotions,” of the fighter. “Weapons and
various items of equipment…were embodied and became one and the same with the
subject....” (363). Forensic evidence shows that the daggers were never used,
but the fact that the soldiers desired them opens the door to an element of
their subjective experience. “The dagger
suggests that, in addition to being the passive victims of mass industrial killing,
the fighters were also willingly prepared to mete out extreme violence on the
battlefield.” (398).”
This newly
understood psychic dependence on things is also seen in memory’s dependence on “external
storage systems” such as writings, artifacts, places, foods, and computers.
According to Merlin Donald (1991), technologies and media, which he calls ‘exograms,’
have constituted part of human cognitive architecture since the upper Paleolithic.
With the use of these material things, thoughts and memories “become more
durable and more easily transmissible and reformattable across media and
contexts and are plugged in to vastly larger databases of inherited knowledge
(Donald, 1991: 314-9, see also Hodder 2012: 35). Warnier points out that this
is because material objects have the advantage of being fairly permanent. “They
help the psyche in its work of establishing duration, memory and a sense of
continuity (Warnier 2001: 17).” This is one reason ancient stones in the
landscape were so important in establishing ‘place’ (Tilley 2004). Michel
Serres says our relationships would have been “airy as clouds were there only
contracts between subjects. In fact, the objects…stabilize our relationships” (1995:
87, quoted in Olsen: 9, and Hodder 2011: 159). This has also been emphasized by
M. Kwint et all (1999) in Material
Memories, which examines the way objects 'speak' to us through the memories
that we associate with them.
[1]
See Hamlet’s Mill: and essay
investigating the origins of human knowledge and its transmission through myth,
by Giogio De Santillana and Hertha von Dechend (1998), David R. Godine,
Publisher, Inc. New Hampshire. They’re argument is that there is an
astrological demention to myths.
No comments:
Post a Comment